Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-of-Interests Test to Limit Standing under the Endangered Species Act by Rennie, Sheldon K.
Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 5 
1996 
Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-of-Interests Test to Limit 
Standing under the Endangered Species Act 
Sheldon K. Rennie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sheldon K. Rennie, Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-of-Interests Test to Limit Standing under the 
Endangered Species Act, 7 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 375 (1996). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/5 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1996]
BENNETT v. PLENERT: USING THE ZONE-OF-INTERESTS
TEST TO LIMIT STANDING UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The zone-of-interests test is a standing requirement set forth by
the United States Supreme Court.1 The Court enunciated that to
obtain standing, a plaintiff's injury must fall "arguably within the
zone-of-interests" created by the statute in question.2 The applica-
tion of the test outside of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),3
however, has been questioned. In particular, its application as a
means of denying citizen suit standing has been the point of much
debate.4
Congress has incorporated citizen suit enforcement provisions
into environmental statutes to allow "private individuals and organi-
zations to file civil actions to remedy statutory violations or to com-
pel the performance of federal agency actions made mandatory by
1. See Association of Data Processing Servs. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). See also infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of Data
Processing and its application of the same interests test.
2. Id. at 153. For a discussion of the zone-of-interests test, see infra notes 29-
41 and accompanying text.
3. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1994)). The APA
grants standing to persons aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act
provides in pertinent part:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the
United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a
claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to
act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the
United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.
Id.
4. Lisa M. Bromberg, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Where Does the Standing
Issue Stand in Environmental Litigation, 16 AM.J. TRAL ADvoc. 761, 764 (1993) (stat-
ing standing requirements and prudential limits are evasive and not subject to con-
crete definition);Jeffery W. Ring & Andrew F. Behrend, Using Plaintiff Motivation to
Limit Standing: An Inappropriate Attempt To Short-Circuit Environmental Citizen Suits, 8
J. ENVrL. L. & LrriG. 345, 353 (1994) (citing Lawrence Gerschwer, Informational
Standing Under NEPA: Justiciability and the Environmental Decisionmaking Process, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 996, 1009 (1993)) (stating prudential considerations should not be
considered once Article III standing requirements have been satisfied).
(375)
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those statutes."5 Despite Congress's intent to make agency action
reviewable, courts frequently impose prudential restrictions on
standing which often require plaintiffs to satisfy certain compo-
nents before the court grants standing.6
In Bennett v. Plenert,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed a dismissal by the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon of a citizen suit under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA).8 The Ninth Circuit held that the broad
language of the citizen suit provision of ESA did not render the
5. Robert B. June, The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the
Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENVrL. L. 761, 762 (1994). As a response to percep-
tions of government failure to enforce the Clean Air Act (CAA), Congress, in 1970,
included the citizen suit provision as the amendments to the statute. Id. at 764
(citing Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 12(a), 304, 84 Stat.
at 1705-07 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. II
1990))). Following its inclusion into CAA, the citizen suit provision became the
subject of environmental litigation. Id. at 765. Generally, citizen suit provisions
grant authority to "any person" to file suits. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA) § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988). See also The Endangered Species
Act (ESA) Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994)). The citizen suit provision of the ESA provides in part
that, subject to certain exceptions, "any person may commence a civil suit on his
own behalf- (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency... who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof." ESA
§ 11 (g) (1) (a), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (A). Some citizen suit provisions include ex-
ceptions which preclude citizen standing where governmental agencies are pursu-
ing enforcement actions or, where federal agencies have not received proper
notice of violations to allow them to bring an action or correct any violations com-
mitted by the agency. Ring & Behrend, supra note 4, at n.25 (citing ESA § 11, 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2)).
For example, § 11046(a) of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act limits citizen suits to enumerated violations in the Act. Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (1988). Also,
the Clean Water Act (CWA) limits citizen suits to plaintiffs alleging non-compli-
ance with an "effluent standard or limitation." CWA § 505(0, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(0
(1988).
6. Martha Colhoun & Timothy S. Hamill, Environmental Standing In The Ninth
Circuit: Wading Through The Quagmire, 15 PUB. LAND L. REv. 249, 269 (1994). The
Supreme Court has rendered prudential restrictions moot where Congress pro-
vided a citizen-suit provision. Id. at 270. Some examples of prudential require-
ments include the zone-of-interests test and third-party standing. Id. at 270-77.
The zone-of-interests test requires that a plaintiff's alleged injury fall within the
zone-of-interests protected by the particular statute in question. Id. at 270. Third
party standing restricts a plaintiff from asserting the legal rights of another. Id. at
275. The nexus requirement provides that there must be a relationship between
the injury suffered and the constitutional right alleged to be violated. Id. at 277.
7. 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Penert, see infra notes 80,
90-115 and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 917. See also ESA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1531. For a discussion of ESA's
citizen suit provision, see infra note 9. Congress enacted the ESA for the conserva-
tion of endangered and threatened species. ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (b). Its
policy for the statute was based upon the following findings:
2
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PLENERT
zone-of-interests test inapplicable to the determination of pruden-
tial standing.9 The court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit and other
courts have repeatedly employed the zone-of-interests test in deter-
mining standing despite Congress's enactment of expansive citizen
suit provisions.10 Specifically, the court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring an action pursuant to ESA, because they
did not assert any interest in preserving endangered species of
fish.11
This Note explores the zone-of-interests requirement adopted
by the Ninth Circuit, focusing on the court's limitation of standing
regarding the action brought pursuant to ESA's citizen suit provi-
sion. 12 Further, this Note analyzes the soundness of the court's
analysis by evaluating the court's reliance on precedent as support
for applying the zone-of-interests test in Plenert.13 Next, this Note
demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit's application of the zone-of-in-
terests test, limiting standing under citizen suit provisions, is con-
trary to established precedent.' 4 Finally, this Note discusses the
impact that the Ninth Circuit's zone-of-interests test will have on a
plaintiff's willingness to bring suit pursuant to ESA in addition to
the impact that the decision will have on Congress's goal in enact-
ing citizen suit provisions. 15
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States
have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and
development untempered by adequate concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted
in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecologi-
cal, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation
and its people; ....
ESA § 2(a) (1)-(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1)-(3).
9. Peneyt, 63 F.3d at 918.
10. Id. at 918 n.4. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Penert,
see infra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
11. Penert, 63 F.3d at 921-22. For a discussion of the court's holding in Plenert,
see infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the zone-of-interests
test as a standing requirement under the ESA, see infra notes 98-112 and accompa-
nying text.
13. For a discussion of the cases the Penert court relied on in support of its
holding, see infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of cases and commentaries that contravene the Ninth
Circuits holding in Plenert, see infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the impact of the Plenert court's holding, see infra
notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
1996]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States Supreme Court's Position on Standing
Standing to sue is a doctrine that originated in Article III of the
United States Constitution.1 6 This doctrine limits judicial power to
"cases or controversies" and has been developed through ex-
panding case law. 17 The Supreme Court has delineated a three
part test for standing: (1) a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury
in fact," that is an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is
concrete and particularized;18 (2)"there must be a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the conduct complained of [such that]
the injury has to be 'fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court;' "19 and (3)"it must
be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be
'redressed by a favorable decision.' "20
A plaintiff must demonstrate the minimum standing require-
ments in order to confer jurisdiction on a court to hear a case.21
Congress, however, pursuant to its legislative power, also has the
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III provides in pertinent part: "The
Judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution ... [and] to Controversies between two or more States; between a State
and Citizens of another State." Id.
17. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating that alleged
injury must be " 'distinct and palpable' " (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) ("No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of fed-
eral-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies."); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97 (1968) (stating federal judicial power limited to disputes capable of resolu-
tion and restricted to a role consistent with system of separation of powers).
18. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing, inter alia,
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)). For a discussion of the injury in fact
requirement of standing, see infra note 21.
19. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)) (alteration in original). For a discussion of
the causation requirement of standing, see infra note 21.
20. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). For a discus-
sion of the redressability requirement of standing, see infta note 21.
21. Colhoun & Hammill, supra note 6, at 279. The constitutional require-
ments to establish standing are injury in fact, causation and redressability. Id. at
252. The injury in fact component is the threshold issue of standing. Id. It en-
sures that the plaintiff has suffered an injury based on a "personal and cognizable
interest that warrants judicial intervention." Id. The injury must be "concrete and
particularized, and actual or imminent" rather than just hypothetical or conjec-
tural. Id. at 252-53. Although, in the past, courts required plaintiffs to allege in-
jury to economic or property interest, the Supreme Court has held that non-
economic injuries could also satisfy the injury in fact requirement. Id. at 253. See
also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S 727, 738 (1972) (holding that" 'aesthetic, con-
servational, and recreational' " interests could satisfy injury in fact requirement)
4
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authority to grant standing to a broad range of citizens so long as
the minimum constitutional requirements are met.2 2 Conversely,
Congress can limit its grant of standing by use of statutory provi-
sions that fall within the confines of the minimum constitutional
requirements. 23
The "injury in fact" requirement for standing can exist "solely
by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which cre-
ates standing.' "24 Congress enacted citizen suit provisions in many
environmental statutes which enable any person, subject to certain
limitations, to bring a civil suit to enforce environmental statutes.2 5
For example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) allows any citizen to
bring a civil suit on his or her behalf against any other person, in-
cluding the United States, for violation of "[any] effluent standard
or limitation under [the Act] ."26 Further, the Solid Waste Disposal
Act (SWDA) allows any person to bring suit against any other per-
son in violation of "any permit, standard, regulation, condition, re-
(quoting Association of Data Processing Servs. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970)).
The causation requirement for standing requires that there be a causal con-
nection between the plaintiff's "injury and the defendant's misconduct, or that the
injury is fairly traceable to the action being challenged." Colhoun & Hamill, supra
note 6, at 266. The redressability component of standing requires that the injury
complained of be redressed by the relief requested. Id.
22. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. See also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (holding that Congress can extend standing under statute
to limit of Article III).
23. June, supra note 5, at 793-94. For example, Congress can limit citizen suit
provisions by enacting notice requirements and specifying the type of actions that
can be brought under citizen suits. Id. at 793. These legislative limitations, how-
ever, are subject to Article III boundaries. Id. at 794. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1.
24. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)
(quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))). The Court in
Lujan noted that when a plaintiff asserts harm to a procedural interest created by
statute he must demonstrate harm both to a procedural interest and to a separate
substantive interest. Id.
25. For a discussion of Congressional enactment of citizen suit provisions, see
supra, note 5 and accompanying text.
26. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) § 505(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1988). The statute's citizen suit provision provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf- (1)
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or (2) against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
1996] -PLER T 379
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quirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective
pursuant to [SWDA]."27 Accordingly, when Congress has expressly
augmented standing through citizen suit provisions, a court lacks
authority to create prudential barriers to standing.28
The zone-of-interests test first appeared as a standing require-
ment in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp.29 In Data Processing, the plaintiffs were in the business of sell-
ing data processing services to other companies and sued to chal-
lenge a ruling made by the Comptroller of the Currency which
allowed banks to compete with plaintiffs by engaging in this field.30
27. Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988).
The Act's citizen suit provision states in pertinent part:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf- (1)
(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohi-
bition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person, including the United States and any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the elev-
enth amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present
generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or opera-
tor of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or
who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment; or (2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which
is not discretionary with the Administrator.
Id.
28. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (noting
when Congress intends standing to extend to full limits of Article III, courts lack
authority to create prudential barriers to standing under statute in question);
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (noting that
Congress can extend standing to limits of Article III); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Coleman, 400 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Miss. 1975) (noting that ESA's citizen suit
provision "confers automatic standing on any person claiming a violation
thereof"), rev'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
979 (1976).
29. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
30. Id. at 151. In Data Processing, the Comptroller of Currency ruled that na-
tional banks in general, including defendant American National Bank & Trust
Company, can make data processing services available to other banks and to bank
customers as part of their banking services. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the Comp-
troller's ruling violated the National Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5136, 12 U.S.C. § 24
(1994). Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 157 n.2. The National Bank Act provides "that
national banks have power to exercise 'all such incidental powers as shall be neces-
sary to carry on the business of banking.' " Id. (quoting National Bank Act, § 5136,
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994)). The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
standing. Id. at 151. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. Id. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had
standing and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits. Id. at 158.
6
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Interpreting APA section 702, the Supreme Court held that apart
from the "case or controversy" test,31 a plaintiff seeking judicial re-
view pursuant to APA must also show that the interest sought to be
protected is "arguably within the zone-of-interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion. '32 Accordingly, the Court analyzed the legislative history of
the Banking Service Corporation Act, finding that competitors were
within the zone-of-interests protected by the statute.33
Following Data Processing, courts began to apply the zone-of-
interests test as a prudential restriction on standing.3 4 Conse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court re-examined the zone-of-
interests test in Clarke v. Security Industry Ass'n.35 In Clarke, the
Supreme Court addressed the propriety of the Comptroller of the
Currency permitting two national banks to establish and purchase
discount securities brokerage offices.3 6 The Court ultimately reaf-
firmed the validity of the zone-of-interests test set forth in Data
Processing, and reasoned that the plaintiff in Clarke had standing
based on interests sufficiently related to the underlying policies of
the statute at issue, the McFadden Act.
37
31. For description of Article III standing under the U.S. Constitution, see
supra note 16.
32. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. APA grants standing to persons aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
33. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155-156. Section 4 of the Bank Service Corpo-
ration Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 provides: " 'No bank service
corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank serv-
ices for banks.' " Id. This portion of the statute was enacted in response to fears
expressed by senators, that "without such a prohibition, the bill would have ena-
bled 'banks to engage in a non-banking activity.' " Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155.
(quoting S. REP. No. 2105, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-12 (supplemental views of Sena-
tors Murkie and Clarke)).
34. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). Article III requirements limit
judicial power and are not merely factors to be weighed as "so-called 'prudential'
considerations." Id. at 475.
35. Clarke v. Security Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
36. Id. at 390-91. In Clarke, the Court reviewed an application of the zone-of-
interests test as applied to Security Pacific National Bank's and Union Planters
National Bank of Memphis' application for establishment of discount brokerage
subsidiaries. Id. at 390-91. The plaintiff in this case is a trade association represent-
ing both banks. Id. at 392.
The court noted that the McFadden Act "limits 'the general business' of a
national bank to its headquarters and any 'branches' permitted by § 36." Id. at 391
(citing the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 81 (1994)). Section 36(f) of the McFad-
den Act defines "branch" as including "any branch bank, branch office, branch
agency, additional office, or any branch place of business.. . at which deposits are
received, or checks paid, or money lent." 12 U.S.C. § 36(f).
37. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403. Sections 36 and 81 of the McFadden Act reflect
Congress's intent "to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly over credit
1996] PL-.NER T
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The Clarke Court redefined the zone-of-interests test, stating
that it "is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress's evi-
dent intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a par-
ticular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency
decision."3 8 Moreover, the court broadened the scope of the test,
denying review only if "the plaintiff's interests are so marginally re-
lated to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that
it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit
the suit."3 9 Further, the Court demonstrated the test's elasticity,
noting that explicit congressional purpose is not necessary in order
for a "would-be plaintiff" to be benefitted.40
Significantly, the Court in Clarke modified future application
of the zone-of-interests test by commenting that, although pruden-
tial standing inquiries outside of the APA context may resemble the
zone-of-interests test inquiry under the APA, courts should not feel
free to apply the test universally.41 As a result of the Court's broad
and money through unlimited branching." Id. at 403. Congress was concerned
with "the perceived dangers of unlimited banking." Id. at 402. This concern is
demonstrated in Representative McFadden's explanation that:
[The Act] prohibits national banks from engaging in state-wide
branch banking in any State (secs. 7 and 8); it prohibits a national bank
from engaging in county-wide branching in any state (secs. 7 and 8); it
prohibits national and State member banks [of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem] from establishing any branches in cities of less than 25,000 popula-
tion (secs. 8 and 9); it prohibits national banks from having any branches
in any city located in a State which prohibits branch banking (sec. 8); it
prohibits a national bank after consolidating with a State bank to con-
tinue in operation any branches which the state bank may have estab-
lished outside of city limits (sec. 1).
Id. at 402 n.17 (quoting 66 CONG. REc. 1582 (1925) (remarks of Rep. McFadden)).
38. Id. at 399. In Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351
(1984), the Supreme Court recognized a presumption in favor of'judicial review of
agency action but found that the presumption is "overcome whenever the congres-
sional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme.'" Id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 157).
39. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. For a discussion of cases where plaintiffs were
granted standing because of the broad scope of the Clarke test, see infra note 42
and accompanying text.
40. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400. Courts that have applied the zone-of-interests
test as a standing requirement have noted that notwithstanding the test, the mini-
mum constitutional requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability
must be met. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sep-
aration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (noting that prudential
limitations on standing should not be mistaken for Article III requirements; Article
III requirements are not factors to be weighed in prudential considerations but
instead act as limitations on judicial power).
41. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16. The Court stated that "[w]hile inquiries into
reviewability or prudential standing in other contexts may bear some resemblance
to a 'zone-of-interests' inquiry under the APA, it is not a test of universal applica-
tion." Id. The Court commented that the zone-of-interests test historically has
been applied to APA claims and "is understood as a gloss on the meaning of sec-
8
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construction of the zone-of-interests test, it became difficult for
courts to deny standing to a plaintiff under the APA.42 More im-
portantly, despite Clarke's limitation of the test's application to non-
APA actions, many courts continued to apply the test as a pruden-
tial standing requirement in non-APA as well as APA actions. 43
This ambiguity has created a split in the circuits concerning the
application of the zone-of-interests test as a prudential limitation on
citizen suits.
44
B. Division Among the Circuits
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel (Defenders of Wildlfe I1),45 the
Eighth Circuit considered the application of the zone-of-interests
test as a standing requirement to an action brought under ESA.
4 6
Plaintiffs, a group of environmental associations, brought an action
to challenge a final regulation issued by the Department of Interior
which provided that federal agencies which finance projects in for-
eign countries are not required to follow ESA's consultation provi-
tion 702." Id. The Court further stated that the "invocation of the 'zone-of-inter-
ests' test ... should not be taken to mean that the standing inquiry under whatever
constitutional or statutory provision a plaintiff asserts is the same as it would be if
the 'generous review provisions' of the APA apply." Id. (quoting Association of
Data Processing Servs. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970)).
42. See, e.g., Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568, 1582-83 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that even if plaintiffs' interests were inconsistent with underlying
purpose of Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act (AICA), defendant still must show
"that this inconsistency is so fundamental as to make it impossible to believe that
Congress intended to permit [plaintiffs] to bring suit"). But see Nevada Land Ac-
tion Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713, 716 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that plaintiffs lacked standing under National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) because they asserted economic rather than environmental injuries).
43. See, e.g., Dan Caputo Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 749 F.2d
571 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that zone-of-interests test in cases not under APA is
same when applied to actions under APA). In Dan Caputo, the court acknowl-
edged that the action would not involve the APA, yet it applied the zone-of-inter-
ests test as a prudential basis for standing. Id. at 574-75. See also Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 281-85 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court ap-
plied the zone-of-interests test as a prudential standing requirement to deny judi-
cial review of agency action under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA). Id. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)
§§ 3001-5006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-56 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The plaintiffs did not
bring their claim directly under the citizen suit provision of RCRA, but instead
sought review of agency action under APA. Id.
44. For a discussion of the split amongst the circuits, see infra notes 45-61 and
accompanying text.
45. 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, (1988), on remand to 707 F.
Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'g sub nom. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d
117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 500 U.S. 915 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 504
U.S. 555 (1992).
46. Defenders of Wildlife I, 851 F.2d at 1039.
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sion.47 Plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Interior regulation
violated the consultation provision of ESA by not requiring consul-
tation in foreign countries. 48 The United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction finding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy Article
III standing requirements. 49
Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit clarified the requirements
necessary to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution
and found that the plaintiffs had met the standing requirement.50
In addressing the application of the zone-of-interests test to ESA
actions, the Eighth Circuit demonstrated the inapplicability of the
47. Id. at 1036-38. Plaintiffs are members of various environmental organiza-
tions: Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and Their Environment, and the
Humane Society of the United States (collectively Defenders). Id. at 1036.
48. Id. at 1037-38. ESA provides that a federal agency must consult with the
Secretary to ensure "that any action it authorizes, funds or carries out, in the
United States or upon the high seas is not likely to jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of any listed species . . . ." 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (1995). See ESA §§ 4,7, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536. Section 4(b) (2) provides in pertinent part: "The Secretary
shall designate critical habitat, and make revisions thereto, under subsection (a) of
this section on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into
consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying
any particular area as critical habitat." ESA § 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(2).
Section 7(a) (2) provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assist-
ance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as "agency
action") is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endan-
gered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secre-
tary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical,
unless such agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the
Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of this section. In fulfilling the
requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific
and commercial data available.
ESA § 7(a) (2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2).
49. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel (Defenders of Wildlife 1), 658 F. Supp. 43, 48
(D. Minn. 1987), revd, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), on remand to 707 F. Supp.
1082 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'g sub nom. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117
(8th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The district court
found that the plaintiffs lacked any showing of "actual or threatened injury tracea-
ble to the Secretary's reinterpretation of Section 7" of ESA. Id. In addition to
their alleged injuries, the plaintiffs submitted several additional reasons why the
court should hear their case. Id. at 46 n.4. First, they contended that the issue
raised by their complaint is one of law, and thus is appropriate for ajudicial deter-
mination. Id. Second, they asserted that the scope of the lawsuit is purely legal,
and a factual record or factual setting is unwarranted. Id. Finally, they asserted
that they have a profound interest in protecting endangered species. Id. The dis-
trict court found that "[elven these practical considerations, standing alone or
when combined, cannot overcome the requirements of Article III." Id.
50. See Defenders of Wildlife II, 851 F.2d at 1039 n.2. For a discussion of constitu-
tional requirements for standing see supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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zone-of-interests test in limiting citizen suit provisions of ESA. 51
The court stated that when Congress has enacted statutes establish-
ing judicial review of actions by public officials authorized to per-
form particular functions, the question of standing "must begin
with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes
review at the behest of the plaintiff."52 The court found that be-
cause ESA's citizen suit provision allows that "'any person' may
commence a suit to enjoin any person who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of ESA... [d]efenders therefore need meet only the constitu-
tional requirements for standing for their claim under ESA." 53
Conversely, in Humane Society of the United States v. Hodel,54 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied
the zone-of-interests test to plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to
ESA. 55 In Humane Society, plaintiffs, an animal protection organiza-
tion and one of its members, brought an action against the Fish and
Wildlife Service for allowing hunting on certain national wildlife
refuges. 56 Finding that plaintiffs met the constitutional require-
ments for standing,57 the D.C. Circuit implemented the zone-of-in-
51. Defenders of Wildlife II, 851 F.2d at 1039. The court noted that through
legislation Congress may eliminate prudential limitations. Id.
52. Id. at 1039 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972)).
The Eighth Circuit noted that apart from constitutional requirements, courts have
frequently imposed prudential or policy requirements on plaintiffs to establish
standing. Id.
53. Id. Defenders also alleged violations under APA § 702. Id. at n.2.
54. 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
55. Id. at 61. Plaintiffs were the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS)
and Rodger Kindler, a member of HSUS. Id. at 47. Plaintiffs allege that the Wild-
life Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) §§ 101-
105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-35 (1988); ESA §§ 2-18, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994); the
Refuge Recreation Act of 1962 (RRA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 460(k) (1)-(4) (1994); and the
National Wildlife Refuge System Administrative Procedure Act (NWRSAPA), 16
U.S.C. § 668dd (1994). Id. The district court held that Kindler had standing
solely as to the NEPA violations, and HSUS did not have standing as to any of the
claims. Id. Deciding the ESA claim, the district court found that HSUS's injuries
fell outside the zone-of-interests protected by the ESA. Id. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court's finding that HSUS failed to establish standing pursu-
ant to any of the statutes, and remanded the case to permit HSUS to pursue its
challenge to the introduction of hunting at the Chincoteague preserve. Id.
56. Id. at 48-49. America has over 400 national wildlife refuges scattered
throughout most of the states and 5 trust territories. Id. at 47. Many of the wildlife
refuges were created through executive orders and others through "statutorily-au-
thorized land purchases." Id. at 47-48. Many of the orders creating these refuges
contain provisions "prohibiting the taking of wildlife 'except under such rules as
may be promulgated by the appropriate Secretary.' " Id. at 48. (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 51 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982)). The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals described standing as having three demands:
[A] t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes
the Court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual
1996] .. ,'IR T
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terests test as an additional requirement.58 The court relied on
Clarke, stating that "[t]he zone of interests test is a guide for decid-
ing whether, in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency
action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be
heard to complain of a particular agency decision."59 Accordingly,
the court found that the plaintiffs' claim fell within the zone-of-in-
terests protected by ESA.60 The court, however, failed to address
whether the zone-of-interests test overrides ESA's citizen suit
provision. 61
Hearing the appeal of Defenders of Wildlife II, the Supreme
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,62 limited the scope of citizen
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant,' and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged
action' and is 'likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'
Id. at 51 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). The circuit court found that
HSUS's allegations that it demonstrated a strong interest in the preservation, en-
hancement and humanitarian treatment of wildlife is a "mere emotional injur[y]"
and noncognizable. Id. at 52. The court, however, ruled that HSUS's second injury
of obstruction of recreational use of the refuge system and observation of the wild-
life is "clearly cognizable." Id. The court further found that HSUS had standing to
bring a suit on behalf of its members stating:
[A] n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organiza-
tion's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. -
ft Id. at 52-53 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
58. See id. at 61. After consulting the legislative history of the Refuge Acts, the
court determined that the Act's policies encompassed the protection of human
aesthetic interest in viewing live animals and birds. Id. at 61. As such the court
held that the plaintiffs' interests bore a "plausible relationship" to "the overall con-
text" of the Acts. Id.
59. Humane Society, 840 F.2d at 60. For a discussion of the zone-of-interests
test, see supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 61.
61. See id. at 61 (finding that plaintiffs' interests in watching animals and birds
are within zone-of-interests protected by RRA and ESA without addressing whether
zone-of-interests test overrides ESA's citizen suit provision). See also National Audu-
bon Soc'y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 407 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding plaintiff's
activity of observing and studying wildlife fell within zone-of-interests protected by
ESA and NEPA, without addressing whether test overrides ESA's citizen suit provi-
sion); Idaho, By and Through Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n., 35 F.3d 585, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding state's property interest in
wildlife management brings it within ESA's zone-of-interests).
62. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Defenders of Wildlife II, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), holding that plain-
tiffs lacked standing to bring their action. Id. at 578. For a discussion of the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Defenders of Wildlife II, see supra notes 45-53 and accom-
panying text.
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PLENERT
suit standing.63 In Lujan, plaintiffs brought an action challenging a
regulation requiring federal agencies to consult with the Secretary
of the Interior concerning the applicability of ESA to federally
funded projects in the United States and on the high seas.64 The
Court rejected the view that the injury-in-fact requirement for con-
stitutional standing is fulfilled through citizen suit provisions which
provide that citizens have "[a] ... 'right' to have the Executive ob-
serve the procedures required by law."65 Instead, the Court found
that a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate "that the statute is inva-
lid" and "that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sus-
taining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement," rather
than some indefinite injury shared in common with people gener-
ally.6 As a result, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring the action.67 Although the Court did not define
the boundaries of standing conferred by ESA's citizen suit provi-
sion, its decision would allow Congress to expand standing, by way
of citizen suit provisions, to the full extent allowed by Article 111.68
63. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-78.
64. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59. The plaintiffs brought the action pursuant to
§ 7 of the ESA. Id. at 559. Section 7(a)(2) divides responsibilities regarding the
protection of endangered species between the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce, and requires each federal agency to consult with the rele-
vant Secretary to ensure that any action funded by the agency is not likely to 'Jeop-
ardize the continued existence" or habitat of any endangered or threatened
species. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2).
65. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 & n.8. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that plaintiffs had standing simply because they had suf-
fered a "procedural injury" established by the ESA's citizen suit provision. Id. at
571-72 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 121-122 (8th Cir.
1990)). The appellate court had held that because the citizen suit provision cre-
ates a " 'procedural righ It]' . . . anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge
the Secretary's ... failure to follow procedures" established in the statute, without
regard to any concrete injury flowing from the failure. Id. at 572 (citing Defenders
of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117,121-22 (8th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court noted, however, that it was "not hold[ing] that an individual can-
not enforce procedural rights." Id. at 573 n.8. Rather, "so long as the procedures
in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest" of an indi-
vidual, he or she would have standing. Id.
66. Id. at 574 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923)).
The Supreme Court found that if it were to grant standing to plaintiffs without
some demonstration of direct injury, the court would be overstepping its bounds
and "assum [ing] a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and
co-equal department, an authority which plainly [the court] do[es] not possess."
Id. (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488-89).
67. Id. at 578. The Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals find-
ing that they erred in not granting summary judgment to the United States. Id.
68. See id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also supra note 28 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Congress' expansion of standing to the full limits
of Article III.
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Nevertheless, courts have continued to apply the zone-of-inter-
ests test to limit standing on a prudential basis without addressing
whether it overrides the citizen suit provision of the particular stat-
ute. For example, in Gonzales v. Gorsuch,69 a group of private citi-
zens sued to challenge expenditures approved by EPA and made by
the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG).70 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California granted
summary judgment for EPA.71 The Court of Appeals affirmed be-
cause plaintiff's injury would not be redressed by the relief
sought.72 Similarly, in Dan Caputo Co. v. Russian River County Sanita-
tion Dist.,73 the Ninth Circuit noted that to challenge the agency
action under the APA, the plaintiffs, two construction companies,
must show not only that they satisfy Article III requirements for
standing, but also that they satisfy the zone-of-interests test.74 The
Court denied the plaintiffs' standing under the CWA's citizen suit
provision, holding that the plaintiffs' injury did not "arise from an
69. 688 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 1264. "ABAG is a public entity comprised of 92 local governments."
Id. at 1265 n.1. ABAG applied for, and received, a grant of $4.3 million from EPA.
Id. at 1264-65. The grant was provided to develop and implement a workplan
pursuant to section 208 of the Clean Water Act, "which authorizes areawide waste
treatment management plans, administered by the government and funded by the
EPA." Id. at 1265. Gonzales alleged that ABAG used some of the funds for con-
tracts unrelated to water pollution planning. Id. at 1265 n.7.
71. Id. at 1265 (citing Gonzales v. Costle, 463 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1978)).
72. Id. at 1267-68. The Ninth Circuit found that even though it ordered
ABAG to refund any illegally spent funds, it would not correct the injury allegedly
caused by the misappropriation of funds by ABAG. Id. at 1268. Moreover, the
court found that "[a]ny injunction against future action, ([.. .] would proceed nec-
essarily on an unsubstantiated assumption that more grants would be forthcom-
ing." Id.
73. 749 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1984).
74. Id. at 574. In Dan Caputo, the plaintiffs asserted standing pursuant to sec-
tion 10(a) of APA. Id. (citing APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702). Russian River Sanita-
tion District ("Russian River") awarded the plaintiffs, Dan Caputo Co. and Wagner
Construction Co., a contract to build a sewage treatment system. Id. at 573. A
grant from EPA supplied the money for the venture. Id. A dispute arose between
plaintiffs and defendant Russian River concerning contractual obligations. Id. As
a result, plaintiffs stopped work on the contract and the money from the grant
remained unspent. Id. Pursuant to an agreement between Russian River, EPA and
the California Water Resources Control Board (WRCB), Russian River solicited
bids with the remaining grant money for the completion of the plaintiffs' work. Id.
The plaintiffs brought suit on grounds that the bid solicitation and the contract
offered violated EPA regulations; that the WRCB failed to ensure Russian River's
compliance with the regulations; and that EPA improperly dismissed plaintiffs' bid
protest. Id. The district court found that plaintiffs lacked standing because they
lacked Article III's "injury-in-fact" requirement. Id. The plaintiffs appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. Id.
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interest in the environment," and plaintiffs did "not seek to vindi-
cate environmental concerns."75
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in Bennett v. Plenena6
and found that the zone-of-interests test applied even though ESA
contains a citizen suit provision. 77 In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
cited Pacific Northwest Generating Co-op v. Brown78 and Mt. Graham
Red Squirrel v. Espy79 as precedent for its conclusion that the zone-of-
interests test had been applied directly to suits brought under
ESA.80
In Pacific Northwest, the plaintiffs, purchasers of hydropower,
brought a suit challenging an endangered or threatened species
listing of three salmon populations by the Secretary of Commerce
and Bonneville Power Administration. 81 The plaintiffs brought ac-
tions pursuant to ESA and APA, alleging that the defendants vio-
lated section seven of ESA's "cumulative impact" provision, its "no
jeopardy" provision, its "incidental take" provision, and its "consul-
tation" provision.82 The United States District Court for the District
of Oregon found that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring ESA
claims. 83 The Court of Appeals, however, held that the plaintiffs
had sufficient economic stake in the status of the salmon to qualify
for standing.84
75. Id. at 575.
76. 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995).
77. Id. at 919. For a discussion of Plenert's adoption of the zone-of-interests
test, see infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
78. 38 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994).
79. 986 F.2d 1568, 1581 (9th Cir. 1993).
80. Plenert, 63 F.3d at 918.
81. Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1060. The National Marine Fisheries Service
listed Snake River sockeye salmon as an endangered species pursuant to ESA, and
the Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon and Snake River fall chinook
salmon as threatened species pursuant to ESA. Id. at 1061. The Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, two of the defendants, increased the
water flow in the Columbia River to benefit the salmon. Id. Because of the de-
fendants' action, the use of water for power production was diminished and the
cost of power supplied by the Bonneville Power Administration was increased. Id.
The Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative, who purchases power supplied by
Bonneville Power Administration, estimated that the increased costs of Bonneville
Power Administration would cause them to either restrict their own output or
purchase power from more expensive sources. Id.
82. Id. at 1061. See ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536. The plaintiffs further alleged
that in the challenged actions, defendants violated APA by engaging in behavior
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with law." Pa-
cific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1062.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1063-66.
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In Mt. Graham, the plaintiffs, environmental groups led by Si-
erra Club, Inc., sought an injunction to halt the University of Ari-
zona's construction of an observatory, which was to be situated in
the habitat of the endangered red squirrel.8 5 The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona denied relief.86 The Court
of Appeals ordered limited remand and thereafter affirmed.
8 7
However, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing
because they suffered sufficient injury and their injury was within
the zone-of-interests protected by the Arizona-Idaho Conservation
Act (AICA).88 Although the PLenert court originally cited Pacific
Northwest and Mt. Graham for support that the zone-of-interests test
applied to ESA actions, the court relied on its regular application of
the zone-of-interests test to other statutes.89
85. Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs alleged that the project would endanger the Mount Graham red squirrel,
"an endangered species that lives on Mount Graham and exists nowhere else in the
world." Id. at 1569. The University took its proposal to the United States Forest
Service, which resulted in formal consultation between the Forest Service and the
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as required by ESA. Id. at 1570 (citing ESA § 7,
16 U.S.C. § 1536). Pursuant to ESA regulations, a "Biological Opinion" is issued at
the culmination of formal consultation. The FWS issues its conclusions regarding
the likely effects of the proposed action. Id. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1994). The
"Biological Opinion" concluded that the University's project would "significantly
increase the risks faced by the red squirrel." Mt. Graham, 986 F.2d at 1570. The
opinion identified three "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the plan which
"would avoid the adverse consequences for the red squirrel that were likely to fol-
low from implementation of the University's original proposal." Id. Due to the
possibility that other members of the project might build the observatory in an-
other country, the University acted to prevent further delay, asking Congress to
intervene. Id. As a result, Congress enacted Title VI of the Arizona-Idaho Conser-
vation Act (AICA). Id. AICA deemed the requirements of section 7 of ESA satis-
fied with respect to the consultation portion of the project, and therefore
instructed the Secretary of Agriculture "immediately" to issue a "special use per-
mit" allowing construction to go forward. Id. (citing AICA, § 602(a) (1988)).
Section 602(a) of the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act provides:
Subject to the terms and conditions of Reasonable and Prudent Al-
ternative Three of the Biological Opinion, the requirements of section 7
of the Endangered Species Act shall be deemed satisfied as to the issu-
ance of a Special Use Authorization for the first three telescopes and the
Secretary shall immediately approve the construction of the following
items: (1) three telescopes to be located on Emerald Peak; (2) necessary
support facilities; and (3) an access road to the Site.
AICA, Pub. L. No. 100-696, § 602(a) (1988).
86. Mt. Graham, 986 F.2d at 1570.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1581-82.
89. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of
the cases relied on by the P/enert court, see infra notes 126, 129-33 and accompany-
ing text.
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III. BENNrT7" v. PLENERT
A. Facts and Procedural History
In P/enert, plaintiffs, two ranch operators and two irrigation dis-
tricts, filed a suit against the United States government challenging
its biological opinion issued pursuant to ESA.90 In its opinion, the
government determined that to preserve the Lost River and Short
Nose species of sucker fish a specific minimum water level should
be maintained in two reservoirs. 91 Plaintiffs asserted standing pur-
suant to ESA based on their "use of the reservoir water for commer-
cial (and recreational) purposes."92 They maintained that their
reason for seeking to prevent the government from raising the min-
imum reservoir levels was to guarantee water will be obtainable for
their own commercial and recreational use. 93 Plaintiffs alleged that
the opinion was devoid of data to support the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service's judgement that the extended operation of
the Klamath Project would detrimentally affect the sucker fish. 94
The district court held that plaintiffs lacked standing because their
90. Id. at 916. Section 7(b) (3) (A) of the ESA states in part:
Promptly after conclusion of consultation under paragraph (2) or
(3) of subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall provide to the
Federal agency and the applicant, if any, a written statement setting forth
the Secretary's opinion, and a summary of the information on which the
opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the species or its
critical habitat.
ESA § 7(b)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3)(A).
91. Penert, 63 F.3d at 916. The issuance of a "Biological Opinion," whereby
the Fish and Wildlife Service presents its conclusions concerning the likely effects
of the proposed action, follows "formal consultation" between the Forest Service
and the Fish and Wildlife Service. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. "[A]'Biological assessment'
refers to the information prepared by or under the direction of the Federal agency
concerning listed and proposed species and designated and proposed critical
habitat that may be present in the action area and the evaluation potential effects
of the action on such species and habitat." Id. " 'Formal consultation' is a process
between the Service and the Federal agency that commences with the Federal
agency's written request for consultation under section 7(a) (2) of the Act and con-
cludes with the Service's issuance of the biological opinion under section 7(b) (3)
of the Act." Id.
92. Penert, 63 F.3d at 916. Plaintiffs filed suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief in an effort to compel the government to retract portions of the biological
opinion. Id.
93. Id. The plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to ESA, alleging that the govern-
ment violated ESA's consultation provisions and declined to contemplate the eco-
nomic effect of its conclusion. Id. at 916-17. For the textual language of ESA's
consultation provision, see supra note 48.
94. PLenert, 63 F.3d at 916. Plaintiffs alleged that the evidence demonstrates
that the fish are not in need of special protection but instead are "reproducing
successfully." Id.
1996]
17
Rennie: Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-of-Interests Test to Limit Sta
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
392 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. VII: p. 375
suits were based on an interest not aligned with those protected by
ESA. 95
B. Narrative Analysis
In Plenert, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the zone-of-interests test pre-
cluded plaintiffs' action under ESA.96 The court stressed that it was
not inquiring whether plaintiffs met the constitutional require-
ments for standing.97 Accordingly, the court in Clarke commenced
its analysis by examining the genesis of the zone-of-interests test in
Data Processing and its "exegesis."98 Although, the Plenert court ac-
knowledged Clarke's limitation on the application of the test,99 the
court applied the zone-of-interests test to deny standing to plain-
tiffs' claims brought pursuant to ESA.100 The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that Clarke did not explain how the test might differ when
applied to non-APA actions.' 01 As a result, they followed the prac-
tice of other courts that applied the test to non-APA actions. 10 2
95. Id. at 917. The interests protected by ESA are those of the fish's use of the
water as a habitat. Id. at 919. The plaintiffs also brought related claims under
APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, and NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Id. at
916. This Note focuses only on the EPA claim brought by the plaintiffs, and its
application to EPA's citizen suit provision.
96. Id. at 917.
97. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the zone-of-interests test applies even to
plaintiffs that have satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing by assert-
ing a procedural injury. Id. at 917 n.1 (citing Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d
1495, 1500-1501 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 698 (1996)); Yesler Terrace
Community Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 447 (9th Cir. 1994).
98. Plenert, 63 F.3d at 917. For a discussion of the zone-of-interests test as
applied in Clarke, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the zone-of-interests test in Data Processing, see supra notes 29-33 and accompany-
ing text.
99. Id. The Plenert court stated that "the Clarke Court made it clear that some
form of the zone test applies even in cases which are not brought under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act." Id. (citing Clarke v. Security Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S.
388, 400 n.16 (1987)). The Court in Clarke, however, noted that the test, while not
one of universal application, has been traditionally used in APA contexts. Clarke,
479 U.S. at 400 n.16.
100. Plenert, 63 F.3d at 919. The court noted that any ruling to the contrary
would give plaintiffs ground to sue even though their purposes were plainly incon-
sistent with, or only "marginally related" to, those of the ESA. Id. (citing Clarke v.
Security Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)).
101. Id. at 917.
102. Id. The Ninth Circuit cited several cases where courts have applied the
zone-of-interests test to APA as well as non-APA actions. Id. See, e.g., Central Ari-
zona Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1539, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
94 (1993) (finding that District's economic injury falls within zone-of-interests pro-
tected by CAA); Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Korioth, 993 F.2d 479, 484 (5th
Cir. 1993) (finding that employer plan sponsors and contract administrators are
within Employee Retirement Income Security Act's zone-of-interests); ANR Pipe-
18
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The court next addressed the issue of whether the zone-of-in-
terests test is applicable in limiting standing in light of ESA's citizen
suit provision.103 The court cited Pacific Northwest Generating Co-op
v. Brown,10 4 and Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy,105 as support that
the zone-of-interests test has been applied directly to claims
brought pursuant to ESA. 106 The Ninth Circuit then renounced its
dependence on Pacific Northwest and Mt. Graham as support in ap-
plying the zone-of-interests test to ESA.10 7 The court, nonetheless,
concluded that the zone-of-interests test was applicable despite
Congress's enactment of citizen suit provisions.'08
The Plenert court relied on cases involving statutes containing
citizen suit provisions to demonstrate that the zone-of-interests test
may be utilized to assess the standing of plaintiffs who have sued
line Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 860 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir.
1988) (finding that pipeline companies are within zone-of-interests to be protected
under Natural Gas Act and Natural Gas Policy Act), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051
(1989).
103. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of
ESA's citizen-suit provision, see supra note 25.
104. 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
105. 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993).
106. Plenert, 63 F.3d at 918 (citing Pacific Northwest Generating Co-Op v.
Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994)); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986
F.2d 1568, 1581 (9th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiffs contended that these cases do not an-
swer the question of whether ESA's citizen-suit provision overrides the zone-of-
interests test's limitation on standing. Id. The court further acknowledged that
there is a split in the circuits as to whether the zone-of-interests test applies to ESA
suits. Id. at n.3. See Idaho By and Through Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. ICC, 35
F.3d 585, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that Idaho's property interest in Wildlife
Management Area falls within ESA's zone-of-interests); Humane Soc'y of the
United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that plaintiff's
aesthetic interests in watching animals and birds on refuges fell within zone-of-
interests protected by ESA and Refuge Acts); National Audubon Soc'y v. Hester,
801 F.2d 405, 407 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that Audubon Society's interest in
observing and studying wild condors are within zone-of-interests of EPA and
NEPA). But see Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel (Defenders of Wildlife I1), 851 F.2d
1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, (Defenders of Wildlife 1), 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn.
1987), on remand to 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'g sub nom. Defenders of
Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 555
(1992) (holding that plaintiffs need only satisfy constitutional requirements for
standing under ESA).
107. PLenert, 63 F.3d at 918.
108. Id. The court's conclusion followed from the fact that the Ninth Circuit,
in addition to other courts, "ha[s] regularly employed the zone-of-interests test in
determining standing despite Congress's enactment of expansive citizen-suit provi-
sions." Id. The court further noted that, irrespective of the applicability of the
zone-of-interests test, Congress's use of the phrase "any person" in the citizen-suit
provision of ESA, refers to a more limited class than the statute suggests. Id. at 918
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pursuant to citizen suit provisions. 109 Accordingly, the court held
that ESA's citizen suit provision "does not automatically confer
standing on every plaintiff who satisfies constitutional requirements
and claims a violation of the Act's procedures." 10
After concluding that the zone-of-interests test applied, the
court addressed whether plaintiffs' claim, of commercial and recre-
ational use of the water, falls within the zone-of-interests to be pro-
tected by ESA. 1H Relying on the legislative history of ESA, the
court concluded that only those plaintiffs whose interests are based
on preserving endangered species are protected by the Act. 1 2 Fi-
nally, the Plenert court concluded that ESA provision did not im-
pliedly confer standing to maintain a citizen suit to anyone who
might possibly claim that the government's failure to consider any
of the enumerated factors negatively affected him.11 3
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit improperly interpreted Clarke v. Security In-
dusty Ass'n 1 4 as a basis for applying the zone-of-interests test
109. Plenert, 63 F.3d at 918-19. For a discussion of cases on which the court
relied to show that other courts have applied the zone-of-interests test in determin-
ing a plaintiff's standing, see infra note 125.
110. Plenert, 63 F.3d at 919.
111. Id. The court noted that the purposes of the ESA are dedicated to spe-
cies preservation, and do not encompass plaintiffs' economic and recreational
challenges. Id. at 920 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184
(1978)). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted that although ESA states that the
government should consider economic factors in designating critical habitat for a
species, its intent was not to "confer standing on every plaintiff who could conceiv-
ably claim that the failure to consider one of those factors adversely affected him."
Id. at 921. See ESA § 4(b) (1) (B) (2), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (B) (2). This section
provides in pertinent part: "The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and
make revisions thereto, under subsection (a) (3) of this section on the basis of the
best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact,
and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat."
Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. ESA provides that its purposes are:
(T]o provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened
species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the pur-
poses of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of the
section.
ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 184 (1978) (discussing Congress's intent in enacting ESA).
113. Penert, 63 F.3d at 921. The court noted that by setting forth factors to be
weighed in formulating a plan to protect species, Congress intended simply to en-
sure a rational decision-making process to guide government officials. Id.
114. Clarke v. Security Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
20
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outside of the APA context.1 15 The Plenert court applied the zone-
of-interests test to deny standing to plaintiffs' claims brought pursu-
ant to ESA. As several commentators have noted, however, Clarke's
recognition that the zone-of-interests test is not one of universal ap-
plication demonstrates that the test should be applied only in the
APA context.116
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit misapplied Pacific Northwest1 17
and Mt. Graham18 as precedent for its contention that notwith-
standing ESA's citizen suit provision, the zone-of-interests test has
been applied to actions brought directly under ESA. 19 Contrary to
the Ninth Circuit's contention in Plenert, the Pacific Northwest court
noted that the question of whether plaintiffs must satisfy the "pru-
dential 'zone-of-interests' test" along with Article III standing re-
quirements remains open.120  The court stated that "[it] will
assume that the requirement must be met."' 21 Thus, the Pacific
Northwest court did not address the application of the zone-of-inter-
ests test in offsetting ESA's citizen suit provision. Similarly, in Mt.
Graham, the court never addressed the issue of standing under ESA
because standing was conferred by APA.122
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit improperly applied cases in-
volving citizen suits as support for its proposition that the zone-of-
interests test applies to limit standing despite Congress's enactment
of broad citizen suit provisions. 123 In Gonzales v. Gorsuch, the Ninth
115. See supra note 101 for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
Clarke as a basis for applying the zone-of-interests test in the non-APA context.
116. See Colhoun & Hamill, supra note 6, at 166 (noting that zone-of-interests
test was intended to grant presumptive review in APA cases only - not to limit court
access as prudential restriction). See also June, supra note 5, at 780 (recognizing
that" 'zone-of-interests' test is peculiar to the APA requirement that the plaintiff is
injured 'within the meaning of a relevant statute' ").
117. 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
118. 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993).
119. See Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1995).
120. Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065. The court acknowledged the Eighth
Circuit's refusal to apply the zone-of-interests test to ESA claims as a prudential
standing requirement. Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035,
1039 (8th Cir. 1988)).
121. Id. Without concluding that the zone-of-interests test applied, the court
found that plaintiffs had a genuine economic interest in preserving the salmon
and, consequently, their interest was protected by ESA. Id.
122. Mt. Graham, 986 F.2d at 1581-83. The court found that plaintiffs had
standing under the APA § 10(a) which provides that "a person ... adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof." Id. at 1581 (quoting APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1994)).
123. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1995). In Penert, the
Ninth Circuit stated that the plaintiff in that case was granted standing. Plenert, 63
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Circuit held that the plaintiffs, a group of private individuals, did
not have standing under CWA's citizen suit provision. 124 The court
noted that although the legislative history demonstrated that the
provision "was intended to grant standing to a nationwide class,
comprised of citizens who alleged an interest in clean water," the
relief plaintiffs sought would not redress the injuries alleged. 2 5 Ac-
cordingly, the court never applied the zone-of-interests test to de-
termine standing because it denied standing based on the absence
of the redressability requirement of standing under Article 111.126
F.3d at 918 (citing Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1982)).
However, in Gorsuch, the Ninth Circuit actually held that the plaintiff did not have
standing under the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision because the plaintiff
did not satisfy the redressability requirement for standing. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d at
1266-67. See also Alvarez v. Longboy, 697 F.2d 1333, 1336-38 (9th Cir. 1983) (con-
cluding that citizen suit provision of Farm Laborer Contractor Registration Act
(FLCRA) conferred standing on migrant farmworkers because plaintiffs fell within
zone-of-interests that statute protected); Davis Forestry Corp. v. Smith, 707 F.2d
1325, 1328-29 (11 th Cir. 1983) (concluding that FLCRA's citizen suit provision did
not confer standing on competitors of farm labor contractors because their
claimed injury fell outside zone-of-interests to be protected by statute).
124. 688 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1982).
125. Id. The court cited the legislative history of the Water Pollution Control
Act. Id. at 1266. The legislative history on the Water Pollution Act quotes Senator
Muskie as stating:
[E]very citizen of the United States has a legitimate and established
interest in the use and quality of the navigable waters of the United
States. Thus, I would presume that a citizen of the United States, regard-
less of residence, would have an interest as defined in this bill regardless
of the location of the waterway and regardless of the issue involved.
118 CONG. Rsc. § 33,717 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie), re-
printed in COMM. ON PUBLIC WORS, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 221 (Comm. Print
1973)). Senator Bayh stated in pertinent part:
I believe that the conference provision will not prevent any person or
group with a legitimate concern about water quality from bringing suit
against those who violate the act or a permit, or against the Administrator
if he fails to perform a nondiscretionary act. These sorts of citizen suits in
which a citizen can obtain an injunction but cannot obtain money dam-
ages for himself- are a very useful additional tool in enforcing environ-
mental protection laws....
Id. The court, however, denied standing stating that, "[i]t is a prerequisite of jus-
ticiability thatjudicial relief will prevent or redress the claimed injury, or that there
is a significant likelihood of such redress." Gorsuch, 688 F.2d at 1267 (citing Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976)). The court
further noted that redressability is an aspect of standing. Id.
126. Id. at 1267-68. The Ninth Circuit noted various reasons that could make
a court unable to redress a plaintiff's injury. Id. at 1267. The relief requested may
worsen the plaintiff's position. Id. (citing NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Harris, 607
F.2d 514, 520 (1st Cir. 1979)). Additionally, the court may not be able to form a
meaningful decree, thus making the relief insufficient. Id. (citing Greater Tampa
Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258, 263-64 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
22
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Similarly, in Dan Caputo, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plain-
tiffs met the Article III standing requirements, but failed the zone-
of-interests requirement. 2 7 The court then analyzed the plaintiffs'
assertion of standing under the citizen suit provision of CWA.128
After describing the purpose of the citizen suit provision, the court
concluded that plaintiffs did not have standing because their claims
did not arise out of an interest in the environment.12 9 The court
further noted that the test for standing in actions brought under
the APA is essentially the same as the test for non-APA actions. 130
The Dan Caputo court's contention that the zone-of-interests test is
a generally applicable prudential limitation on standing, however,
was later rejected by the Supreme Court in Clarke.131
Additionally, case law does not support the Ninth Circuit's ap-
plication of the zone-of-interests test as a prudential standing limita-
tion to ESA actions.13 2 In Defenders of Wildlife 1, the Eighth Circuit
held that by passing the citizen suit provision of ESA, Congress re-
moved judicial authority to establish prudential or policy limita-
127. Id. at 574-75. The court ruled that the injury-in-fact portion of the test is
satisfied because, based upon plaintiffs' allegations that they had a right to the
reallocated grant of funds, " 'it reasonably could be inferred that ... there is a
substantial probability' " that once the defendants spend the reallocated funds, the
plaintiffs will not be able to collect it from Russian River. Id. (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)).
The Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs did not meet the zone-of-interests
portion of the standing requirement. Id. at 575. The court ruled that Tide II of
the Clean Water Act does not protect contractors against the reallocation of grant
funds after contract disputes. Id. at 574-75. (citing Clean Water Act §§ 201-17, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1297 (1988)). Further, the court denied the plaintiffs' contention
that they were protected under 40 C.F.R. § 35.939 which "allows would-be bidders
to protest bid solicitations to EPA." Id. at 575 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 35.939 (1983)).
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the regulation was not intended to provide a forum
for funding disputes. Id.
128. Id. at 575. For a description of the citizen-suit provision of the Clean
Water Act, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
129. Dan Caputo, 749 F.2d at 575. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the purposes of
the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, noting that it " 'is to ensure that
an interest in the environment and clean water, whether or not economically
based, is a sufficient basis for acitizen suit.' "Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688
F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1982)). In Dan Caputo, the plaintiffs' claim did not in-
voke an interest in the environment and thus they did not have standing. Id.
130. Id. The court determined that plaintiffs' amended complaint did not
arise under APA. Id. Applying the zone-of-interests test, the court found that
plaintiffs did not fall within the zone-of-interests of the statute to be protected. Id.
131. For a discussion of Clarke's limitation of the zone-of-interests test, see
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of cases rejecting the application of the zone-of-interests
test to limit standing under citizen suit provisions, see supra note 28.
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tions on standing. 33 Further, the Supreme Court has noted that
citizen suit provisions extend to the full extent of Article III.134
Many commentators have agreed that the Court cannot invoke
prudential limitations to deny citizen suit standing as long as Arti-
cle III standing requirements are met.13 5 As Justice Scalia noted,
" 'when the legislature explicitly says that a private right exists, this
so-called 'prudential' inquiry is displaced.' "s6 These types of pru-
dential inquiries by the judiciary, despite Congress's clear intent to
confer standing on citizens who meet the constitutional require-
ments, are a violation of the separation of powers.' 3 7 Congress pos-
sesses the authority to limit the potential plaintiffs that can assert
standing under its citizen suit provisions.13 8 Accordingly, courts
lack the authority to create prudential barriers to standing under
citizen suit provisions. 13 9
V. IMPACT
By applying the zone-of-interests test to deny standing to plain-
tiffs bringing suit pursuant to ESA, the Ninth Circuit has usurped
133. 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's abrogation of the zone-of-interests test as a standing limitation to citizen
suits, see supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
134. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9
(1979) (noting that when Congress demonstrates intention to grant standing, nor-
mal prudential rights do not apply). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975) (noting that Congress may grant right of action to persons who would be
barred by prudential standing). For a discussion of constitutional requirements
for standing under Article III, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
135. Ring & Behrend, supra note 4, at 353 (citing Lawrence Gerschwer, Infor-
mational Standing Under NEPA:Justiciability and the Environmental Decisionmaking Pro-
cess, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 996, 1009 (1993)).
136. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SuFFoLK U. L. Rrv. 881, 886 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
137. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1992); see also Har-
old Leventhal, Article, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 509, 526-27 (1974) (commenting on effectiveness of environmental
decisionmaking when judicial supervision is limited).
138. See Ring & Behrend, supra note 4, at 351 & n.25 (citing Kennecott Cop-
per Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting Congress's limitation of
Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision "to challenging acts flowing from mandatory,
but not discretionary duties")).
139. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (citing
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,103 (1979)); see also Com-
petitive Entertainment Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d
107, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (allowing no prudential considerations under Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that
"[b]ecause EPCA grants standing to a broad group of the beneficiaries of the stat-
ute's programs to conserve fuel, the judicial principal restricting review of so-called
'generalized grievances' is inapplicable").
24
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Congress's traditional law-making function. 140 This contravenes
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Due to the
courts' application of the zone-of-interests test as a prudential
standing requirement, Congress's goal of providing enforcement of
environmental statutes through its citizen suit provisions will be sti-
fled.' 4 1 By allowing this prudential bar, it is impossible to predict
the extent of future judicial lawmaking in this field.
Moreover, creating additional elements to satisfy the standing
requirement can deter "worthy plaintiffs" from seeking to "vindi-
cate valid legal interests." 14 2 This may lead to unnecessary litigation
which in turn burdens the judicial system.' 43
The zone-of-interests test should not be applied to limit stand-
ing under citizen suit provisions. The Ninth Circuit departed from
Congress's explicit intent to allow citizens to bring suit to enforce
ESA. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's application of the zone-of-interests
test to limit standing under ESA's citizen suit provision, is contrary
to precedent set by the Supreme Court and other federal courts.
Sheldon K Rennie
140. See Ring & Behrend, supra note 4, at 355. "For courts to judicially amend
environmental statutes to provide standing to those parties that a court subjectively
finds to be suitable representatives confounds (the] legislat[ure's] purpose and
contradicts the weight of precedent." Id. "If a 'citizen' or 'person' with the mini-
mum standing required by Article III presents a claim that the government has
violated or failed to enforce a statute, courts should consider the claim, not invent
procedural hurdles to dismiss it." Id.
141. Id. at 363. "[I]f Congress lacks power to provide effective enforcement of
the [environmental] statutes, regulatory goals will not be achieved." Id.
142. Id. at 351. "A test for plaintiff motivation adds yet another hurdle to the
already tortuous and confusing gaunlet facing plaintiffs who wish to establish
standing." Id. at 359.
143. Id. at 360 & n. 59-60 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490-91 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). Additional standing requirements lead to two separate
trials on the merits. First, the plaintiff must satisfy Article III injury and redres-
sability requirements to establish standing. Id. at 360. The plaintiff must then in-
troduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate "proper" motivation. Id. If standing is
granted, or its denial is successfully appealed, the plaintiff must cover the same
issues again on a trial on the merits. Id.
1996] PL1_-,VERT 399
25
Rennie: Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-of-Interests Test to Limit Sta
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/5
